

Resettlement anthropology and the Upper Krishna Project

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Big developmental projects displace large numbers of people and cause psychological, physiological and sociocultural trauma. Successful resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced people requires understanding of the sociological complexities involved. Our experience with large irrigation projects provides important lessons.

IN several developmental projects across the world, very large numbers of people are displaced from their existing habitat and need to be resettled elsewhere. Most spectacularly from the reservoir spread of major irrigation and hydroelectric projects, but also from projects involving mining, the construction of ports, and the establishment of industrial townships, such involuntary resettlement involving the disruption and metamorphosis of entire community life-styles invariably causes acute distress and impoverishment to large numbers of the displaced. Even where, in recent years, this has been belatedly recognized through the enhanced importance and funding provided for resettlement, an inadequate understanding of the complexity of the social processes associated with relocation must surely limit the success of any administered programme of resettlement. In this paper I shall argue that such preliminary epistemologies of the resettlement process are now emerging, and could be operationally helpful towards its successful management.

A major irrigation project, in its design and execution, is typically viewed as a collaborative venture of engineers, project managers, agricultural scientists, civil servants, economists, contractors and the farmers who benefit from irrigation. The resettlement and eventual rehabilitation of those displaced is, however, typically seen as a salvage operation, mandated for implementation, and sought to be accomplished within managerial and programme parameters very similar to the rest of the project. However, in much the same way as research on the sociology of irrigated farming systems has revealed that the utilization of water is influenced as much by the adequacy of social

institutions and organizations (underpinned by general concepts of rules, roles and spontaneous group formation¹) as by individual capacities for risk-bearing, the anthropology of resettlement also merits investigation if administered programmes for involuntary resettlement are to succeed.

Such an approach is likely to be helpful provided robust generalizations that are transferable across projects emerge. My objective is to consider some of the conclusions that sociologists who have studied resettlement have reached, and to relate these insights to the outcome of the resettlement process in a single major irrigation project, the Upper Krishna Project (UKP) in northern Karnataka. The replicability and cultural adjustability to UKP of generalizations based on sociologists' field experiences elsewhere constitute, therefore, a preliminary test of the robustness of the generalizations².

There is, at the outset, a preliminary issue of how relevant a development project is, for the purpose of generating sociological enquiry and promoting sociologically guided planned interventions. Cernea³ argues forcefully that, despite the project format concentrating resources on selected priorities, focusing on circumscribed geographical areas and population groups, and thereby constituting segmented units of intervention that bypass 'overall structures', and despite most sociological enquiry being *evaluative* of development results, there are legitimate new entrance points for sociological knowledge being opened by studying large projects, which span operational, organizational and managerial issues. Clearly, large developmental efforts such as major irrigation projects, which mobilize extensive external resources and deploy them in a limited geographical area, must induce rapid social changes. Sociological analysis that identifies homogeneities across projects undertaken in culturally dissimilar milieus ought to be methodologically defensible.

Anthropological perspectives also induce a more conservative systems view of the development process,

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with innovations regarded as ways of reinforcing, rather than escaping from, existing stable modes of existence. Such perspectives are strongly influenced by the work of palaeobiologists. Romer⁴, in his explanation of the origin of land-dwelling vertebrates, argued that the ancestors of these vertebrates lived in pools of water that went seasonally dry. Legs developed out of fins in order to carry them to neighbouring pools and not to enable them to live on land. In this manner, the need for stability can be the main impetus for change, and several sociologists argue that Romer's rule is an apt metaphor for understanding the development process. Thus, Kottak⁵ suggests that successful developmental projects avoid the 'fallacy of overinnovation'. In the same way as the evolution of legs in aquatic creatures (a feature essential to land life) originated to allow continued aquatic existence, in a developmental process (particularly one as disruptive as involuntary resettlement), individuals, families and social groups innovate in a manner that seeks to recreate the earlier stabilities. Such responses to coping with resettlement may therefore be beneficial, and not antagonistic, to the success of the resettlement process, and would need to be incorporated into the development paradigm.

The Upper Krishna Project

UKP has been conceptualized as a long-term development programme for irrigating three districts in northern Karnataka, to be implemented in stages. Stage I, currently under execution, is being implemented in three phases. Phase I commenced in the late 1960s, initially financed exclusively from State Government budgetary resources, and subsequently from 1978 to 1986, partly by the World Bank⁶. Phase II, negotiated with the Bank in November 1988, has recently begun implementation, and is scheduled for completion in 1996⁷.

The project involves the construction of two dams (for storage at Almatti, and primarily for diversion at Narayanpur). The Narayanpur dam was fully constructed in Phase I and the reservoir waterspread will, with its maximum water storage, submerge 132 sq. km, involving 36 villages and farmlands from another 54 villages, affecting in all an estimated 6630 families. The Almatti dam will be constructed to a partial height of 509 metres during Phase II and will then inundate 129 sq. km of land, affecting about 21,600 families (of which about 15,500 families are expected to suffer only temporary submergence of village houses, as the reservoir levels fluctuate seasonally). Finally, road and canal construction is expected to affect nearly 11,900 families, most of whom will lose farmlands to varying extents, but will not be coerced into leaving their homes.

The Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) programme during Phase I attempted to relocate families from 36 villages facing submersion under the Narayanpur reservoir into 27 Resettlement Centres, besides paying monetary compensation under the Land Acquisition Act for all properties lost through submergence. Each Resettlement Centre incorporated essential community infrastructure: school buildings, community halls, gymnasias, playgrounds, panchayat offices, temples and mosques. The Resettlement Centres were electrified, internal roads were laid out, and layouts for house construction were also spaciouly provided. Transportation assistance in relocation was also given, as was some temporary assistance towards consumption expenditure. Of the 36 villages proposed for relocation, only one village has hitherto not shifted and some families from 11 other villages are also yet to shift. (Their houses have hitherto not been submerged as the water level at the dam has been kept 2 metres below full reservoir level.) Elsewhere, relocation has been complete.

Besides the submergence of these villages and their associated farmlands, the Narayanpur reservoir spread also envisaged the submergence of farmlands in another 54 villages. In 1987, the project authorities attempted, on the basis of a sample study, to assess the extent to which compensation amounts received by the displaced for loss of property had been reinvested in farmlands. The study revealed that an estimated 13% of compensated families invested in purchase of replacement farmland. The plight of erstwhile agricultural labour who owned no farmland and therefore received no compensation, but who nevertheless lost opportunities for employment on account of the extensive farmland submergence, was the most serious. Some found local employment in project construction, whereas most migrated out of the area. A large proportion of landed farmers became landless.

Thereby, although the relocation of the displaced into Resettlement Centres during Phase I had been largely accomplished, their economic rehabilitation had clearly not occurred, and post-relocation asset-ownership and income levels had fallen sharply. This compelled a more detailed investigation of the economic impact that displacement induces, and of whether financial and organizational support to the displaced ought to be structured differently during Phase II of UKP.

The resulting policy for Phase II is indeed very differently framed, and will attempt afresh the economic rehabilitation of those families displaced during Phase I, besides the resettlement and rehabilitation of those who will be displaced during Phase II. As a point of departure, all families affected are grouped according to their expected land-holding status *after* land loss. Currently, all displaced families are categorized under five heads: those who have lost *all* land; those who

retain an *uneconomic* holding (less than 1.5 hectares) after land loss; those who retain an *economic* holding after land loss; *landless* families; and those who have lost their *houses* but not farmlands.

Just prior to the commencement of Phase II, a Pilot Project for R&R was implemented, and began in March 1988. It was to cover families displaced from six villages already submerged under the Narayanpur reservoir, where relocation to Resettlement Centres had occurred in 1980. The Pilot Project was expected to test the suitability of R&R policy being restructured for Phase II and the preparedness of the project authorities in implementing it, while also revealing constraints and weaknesses. R&R reliefs were to be provided as follows:

Families who had lost all lands were to be given adequate monetary assistance (as a grant) for purchase of at least 1.5 hectares of irrigated land (or equivalent dry land, estimated at 3 hectares), the monetary support for which would extend up to Rs 30,000.

Families who retained an *uneconomic* holding after land loss were entitled to a grant of up to Rs 10,000, which was expected to fully cover the financing of a suitable income-generating scheme, and were also entitled to a draw-down cultivation facility on a long-term lease basis on the lands acquired from them as they became available for cultivation seasonally.

Families who retained an *economic* holding after land loss were entitled to an income-generating scheme, with bank finance with a 25% Government subsidy, in selected and approved sectors such as animal husbandry, fisheries, poultry, sericulture, irrigation pumping equipment and petty businesses.

Finally, *landless* families were entitled to a monetary grant of Rs 10,000 towards one of two options: the purchase of half a hectare of irrigated land (or equivalent dry land), or the acquisition of a suitable income-generating scheme.

In addition, each family had already been paid compensation under the Land Acquisition Act for farmlands lost, houses submerged or otherwise affected, and any other properties surrendered. Each family covered by the Pilot Project had already been relocated in one of two Resettlement Centres. Thus the objective of the Pilot Project was to attempt an economic rehabilitation of families who had resettled at the two centres eight years earlier in a way that restored their pre-submergence real income levels.

The Pilot Project began in 1988, and a separate documentation exists of several aspects of the Project, the perceptions of those displaced, and a profile of the six villages as they existed prior to submergence⁸. The design and instrumentalities adopted by the Pilot Project were chosen with sensitivity to economic and managerial characteristics of rehabilitation, and in interacting with the families being assisted, several

issues arose that are more directly rooted in the sociology of resettlement. These are discussed below.

Resettlement anthropology and UKP

In assessing the importance of sociocultural and anthropological variables in an R&R programme where a large number of villages are submerged and their inhabitants displaced, I draw upon several facets of the UKP experience: the impact of the resettlement programme during Phase I; the insights emerging from the Pilot Project implemented during 1988-89, including the perceptions of those resettled; and the policy for Phase II, which will underpin the R&R efforts in the years ahead⁹. The insights provided by the sociology of resettlement are likely to be useful if they can provide inputs into the design of an R&R policy rather than constituting mere wisdom by hindsight, and it is such design inputs that I shall emphasize¹⁰.

Psychological shock and risk aversion

Perhaps the most widely documented facet of involuntary relocation is the psychological trauma that people undergo. In having lost not just houses and lands, but also the familiarity of their earlier habitat, the displaced are initially in a state of shock, having exchanged several centuries of historical continuity for an unfamiliar Resettlement Centre. Scudder and Colson¹¹ have documented the many forms that such psychological stress can take: 'the grieving for a lost home' syndrome; traumatic memories of the actual displacement (often administered at very short notice); for those who resettle with success the 'guilt feelings' about others who have been less successful; and the pervading anxieties about the future. Families have to be raised in a new environment and productive systems established for economic survival. With such acute stress, families are initially risk-averse, and yet it is they (and not Government administrators) who must take the major risks.

In Phase I of UKP, those whose lands, houses and other assets were lost were provided compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and encouraged to reinvest in alternative farmland. A sample study conducted by the project authorities several years later revealed that only 13% of compensated families invested (wisely) in the purchase of alternative farmland. Although there could be several reasons for this¹², the dispossessed, when acutely stressed, clearly cannot be left to their own devices to purchase land. In the UKP Pilot Project, the use to which compensation amounts were put was examined in greater detail. Out of 387 families receiving compensation for farmlands lost, only 79 families (or 20%) reinvested in alternative lands, 105 families (27%) used the money for liquidating earlier

debts, 46 families (12%) used the compensation amounts partly for debt liquidation and partly for consumption, and a sizeable 157 families (41%) used it purely for consumption. Psychologically stressed families clearly give priority to immediate consumption, followed by debt liquidation. Were they entrepreneurially inclined risk-takers, they would invest more strongly in land.

Policy for Phase II is more sensitive to these issues, and recognizes that economic rehabilitation must be conceptually distinguished from physical resettlement, requiring different mechanisms of institutional support and economic incentives. Nevertheless, the non-land-based income-generating scheme is seen as a major instrument of economic rehabilitation, and will be loan-financed for those who retain an economic land holding after submergence. Where physical relocation and economic rehabilitation will need to be simultaneous, as will be necessary when the Almatti reservoir fills up, the sanction of several thousand income-generating schemes will imply that household businesses financed through debt would need to be commercially successful. This presupposes strong entrepreneurial instincts and discounts inadequately that families may be psychologically stressed. A choice between land-based and income-generating schemes, if offered to all families, could help in transcending this problem.

Memories of the trauma of the actual displacement were recalled by several families who were assisted in the Pilot Project. Siddapur and Bachihal villages constituted a single village panchayat and even as the Narayanpur reservoir water level came up to the villages, objections intensified and an agitation was raised against relocation. The police camped in the villages for five days, and two sub-inspectors of police (one from Muddebihal and the other from the State Reserve Police) and a police van were brought in. The utter finality of permanent submersion finally induced the relocation of families from these two villages to the Veereshnagar Resettlement Centre.

Physiological shock

Although there is inadequate documentation of whether morbidity and mortality rates increase after involuntary relocation, Scudder and Colson¹¹ argue that 'there is little doubt that relocatees often believe that the elderly in particular are apt to die "of a broken heart" following removal'. Perceptions of the displaced also extend to public health having worsened.

The most strident demand among families in the UKP Pilot Project villages was for more effective measures for malaria control. In exchanging a river bank for a Resettlement Centre at the edge of the reservoir spread, malaria becomes the most dominant cause of ill health, and efforts at curbing malaria in the vicinity of the Narayanpur reservoir have had very

marginal impact. Further, malaria eradication is not seen as part of the R&R effort, and health personnel continue to report to irrigation engineers in charge of civil construction, rather than work within the R&R administration.

Despite the Resettlement Centres being provided with borewells, there was also a widespread consensus among the Pilot Project families that the availability of drinking water had worsened. Earlier, drinking water was liberally available from the river and from open wells nearby, whereas borewell water is now inadequate. These perceptions, too, can only be countered through a finer calibration of water requirements, measured not in terms of the number of borewells drilled but in terms of *per capita* water availability. Earlier R&R efforts have thereby probably underinvested in drinking water supply.

Sociocultural shock

The submergence of an entire village dislocates kinship support and the community network, and dismantles historical associations, religious symbols and myths. These can never be recreated, and disruption in the community network can affect leadership patterns and inter-family dependencies. But can a recognition of this alter the way in which R&R policy is designed? Scudder¹³ reports that in the resettled areas, the displaced benefit by having 'neighbours from familiar and relatively similar class or caste and religious or ethnic backgrounds', and that sociocultural stress is also contained by families 'changing to familiar production techniques, customs, and associates during the initial years'. Thus R&R policy should strive to replicate to the extent possible the neighbourhood networks that existed earlier, as well as to resist overinnovation in the use of production techniques. Romer's rule, as a metaphor for successful developmental projects, has been discussed earlier.

Whereas there has been no systematic assessment of these issues in UKP in relation to R&R during Phase I, certain pointers to the future do emerge. Villages do like to retain their identity, but during Phase I this was not always recognized. Thus, 36 villages that faced submergence were sought to be relocated in 27 Resettlement Centres, denying small villages the liberty to exist independently as distinctive settlements. This is often justified in terms of limiting infrastructural costs, but ignores the sociocultural identity of each village. Consequently, one village, Palgaldinni, with just 54 families, refused to be relocated, as it was to be merged with a much larger village into one Resettlement Centre. It would clearly be desirable to avoid such sociocultural insensitivity.

Sentiments suggestive of such sociological deprivation were also apparent in discussion with families benefitting from the Pilot Project. Relocation had

occurred eight years back, and earlier the villages saw no crime, they said, whereas today petty crime occurs periodically. Earlier there was no drought (some referred to their memories of drought as far back as 1941), whereas lands are more drought-prone today. Such perceptions of the displaced were particularly visible as a loss of cultural identity among those who lived in Bijjur, the largest of the Pilot Project villages. Fairs and jatras, they said, used to be held in the village at least four or five times in the year, whereas now they hold them just once.

Four stages in an R&R process

Not all resettlement processes have been historically involuntary, nor have they all been accomplished with Government assistance. Based on a study of different kinds of resettlement, Scudder¹³ has proposed a conceptual framework that divides each such resettlement process into four (possibly overlapping) stages, typically lasting at least a generation. These stages include (i) planning, initial infrastructural development, and settler recruitment, (ii) transition, (iii) economic and social development, and (iv) handing over and incorporation. Scudder argues that every resettlement process *must* pass through all four stages, though the order of the third and fourth stages may be reversed. If the third stage is bypassed, the community becomes increasingly impoverished; if the fourth is bypassed, the community's dependency on the R&R project agency remains firm.

Clearly, intelligent planning for R&R must attempt to handle all four stages efficiently, but there has been little recognition in planning for UKP that such temporally distinct stages exist. In Phase I, the third stage was not the explicit concern of the project administration, and this was sought to be remedied in six villages in the Pilot Project, and will be extended to other villages under the Narayanpur reservoir in Phase II. Government-sponsored economic rehabilitation will encourage a dependency on the project administration, and handing over and incorporation will need to follow. All this demonstrates that the time schedules for R&R cannot be readily pegged to reservoir submersion dates guided solely by dam completion deadlines. R&R has an autonomy, and a momentum of its own, and although it may be speeded up, it cannot be arbitrarily telescoped into the time schedules for construction of civil engineering works. There is little recognition of this in the planning for Phase II.

Impact on the host population

When displaced communities are resettled in areas where a host population exists and has ownership rights, it is important that the impact of relocation on the host population be studied, as otherwise excessive

pressure on the environment of the host population could occur. Cernea¹⁴ cites an instance of a resettlement plan involving three or four displaced villages with a combined population of 1500–2000, together with 6000–8000 head of livestock, being fitted into a host village which was already at capacity with 300 people and their own livestock.

Phase I resettlement in UKP relocated families from submerged villages into Resettlement Centres, away from existing villages. This sought to avoid a direct clash with villages not submerged. Indirectly, however, the pressure on grazing land for livestock either sets up a situation for conflict or else leads to degradation of the environment. Livestock grazing pressures will need to be more closely assessed in the choice of locations of Resettlement Centres during Phase II.

Families are being rehabilitated, and not individuals

In all the four stages of an R&R process, it is the family, rather than the individual, that is sought to be rehabilitated. In emphasizing the importance of kinship support, Scudder¹³ notes: 'A common mistake is to focus attention on the male farmer as an individual rather than as a household head and family member. The basic building block of any frontier society is the family, however, which is best viewed as a joint decision-making and production unit. Both spouses ideally should be interviewed by settlement authorities prior to recruitment, since the reluctance or unsuitability of one spouse can have an adverse effect on productivity and family stability'.

In most discussions that R&R personnel conducted during the UKP Pilot Project, men were always at the forefront as household representatives. Alternative ways of reaching out to women need to be explored, and the facilitating role of non-Governmental organizations for this purpose would need to be developed.

A complicating factor in the Indian context is joint ownership of land as ancestral property. In UKP it was common to find several brothers shown as joint owners of a single survey number of agricultural land in Land Revenue records, and the brothers may or may not live in the same household under one roof. Ought they to be regarded, for R&R, as one family? The answer to this will depend on whether the household or economic dependency is the determining criterion, and on whether the R&R process is also viewed as an instrument for enhancing the asset base of a joint-family household. Current policy in UKP defines the family in a way that makes economic dependency the determining criterion, though in computing the number of families displaced, the criterion has not been rigorously employed: for landed families, the number of units of land lost has been the basis (and thereby joint owners of a piece of land would be regarded as just one

family); for landless families, independent households have been taken to be separate families.

These inconsistencies arise partly because the family concept is not unambiguous, either in law or in terms of economic dependency, in a society where most households do not contain nuclear families. A family is part of a local convention on how reciprocal and joint relationships between individuals are to be structured, and, clearly, this cannot be ensured purely through legal prescription. More detailed sociological studies of the family as a unit for receiving R&R assistance are needed¹⁵.

Seasonal loss of property

A difficult issue in the design of an R&R policy is the manner in which seasonal loss of property through submergence should be treated. During Phase II of UKP, a one-in-ten-year flood zone for the Almatti reservoir has been adopted as the basis for defining R&R liability in respect of houses. If a house is submerged for even a few hours every ten years, the house must be acquired and compensation paid, and the inhabitants moved elsewhere.

Although such a legal liability appears fair, it will not, however, ensure that inhabitants shift village and relocate. In the absence of near-permanent submergence, experience in many projects (including the Narayanpur reservoir) suggests that inhabitants will not shift. Relocation is traumatic, as discussed earlier, psychologically, physiologically and socioculturally.

Current policy for the Almatti reservoir does not adequately recognize this dilemma, possibly on account of inadequate sensitivity to the sociological impulses to relocation. As I have argued elsewhere, there appear to be two objectives sought to be combined in specifying a flood zone of seasonal submergence: the demarcation of a *safety zone* within which Government can assume no liability for life and property after the Project commences; and a zone from which relocation will occur if compensation is paid¹⁶. Clearly, the two zones need not coincide, though much of the planning for UKP Phase II has assumed that they will. Although I have argued that special legislation is needed that pays compensation for houses *conditional* on the families moving permanently to higher ground in order to reconcile the two facets of the flood zone concept (a conditionality not currently permissible in the Land Acquisition Act), this too may prove ineffectual unless such resettlement acquires a voluntary and spontaneous dimension and is not perceived as uncompromisingly mandatory.

The sociology of the project administration

The largest migrants into areas where a large developmental project is undertaken are the project

administrators, and the sociology of such a project management team has been little studied, though it is widely perceived as being inimical to the interests of those whose lands and houses are submerged. The construction of dams and several thousand kilometres of the water conveyance network acquires such an overriding and unquestionable legitimacy that attempts to temper such objectives through a pinpointing of unnecessary distress caused is generally unsuccessful. Cannot the dam height be lowered a little if several villages can thereby escape submergence? Cannot the configuration of canals be designed such that most farmers who lose lands for canal construction also benefit through irrigation on retained lands? The *engineering bias*¹⁷ implicit in the inadequate consideration of these issues further complicates the R&R process.

Such a bias gets reinforced through the dichotomy in the manner in which large irrigation projects are administered, with the Irrigation Department entrusted with project design and civil engineering construction, and the Command Area Development Authority (CADA) made responsible for R&R, and with neither organization provided superintendence over the other. As each organization has different constituency interests, the paths of the two diverge readily during project implementation, with an uneasy overlap between the social engineering objectives of R&R and the engineering objectives of dam and canal construction. R&R activities inevitably acquire secondary importance, and together with the tensions that they generate, lead to risk aversion in decision-making among R&R staff when liberal policy flexibility, even generosity, are instead called for (see Maradi, Nayak and Patil⁸ for a documentation of how such risk aversion is induced, in their discussion of the UKP Pilot Project). Unless overall project management objectives are more closely synchronized, R&R will continue to have the feel of an insensitive salvage operation in the perceptions of those displaced.

1. The sociology of irrigated farming systems is discussed, for instance, in Coward, E. W., 'Technical and social change in currently irrigated regions: Rules, roles and rehabilitation', in *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development* (ed. Cernea, M. M.), Oxford University Press, 1985.
2. This is admittedly a weak test of robustness. However, if the Popper criterion (Popper, K., *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Hutchinson, 1959) of falsifiability as providing the demarcation between science and non-science is accepted, the non-economic social sciences would need to search for other criteria of robustness.
3. Cernea, M. M., 'Entrance points for sociological knowledge in planned rural development', in *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, Vol. 3 (ed. Schwarzweiler, H.), JAI Press, 1987.
4. Romer, A. S., *Man and the Vertebrates*, Vol. 1, 3rd edn, Penguin Books, 1960.
5. Kottak, C. P., 'When people don't come first: Some sociological lessons from completed projects', in *Putting People First*:

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- Sociological Variables in Rural Development* (ed. Cernea, M. M.), Oxford University Press, 1985.
6. Through the Karnataka Irrigation Project. See World Bank, *India: Karnataka Irrigation Project—Project Completion Report*, December 1988, for an evaluation of the Project as contained in its Project Completion Report.
 7. See World Bank, *Staff Appraisal Report: India—Upper Krishna (Phase II) Irrigation Project*, April 1989, which provides comprehensive details of Phase II, and of agreements reached during negotiations.
 8. Maradi, C. M., Nayak, P. J. and Patil, R. S., *Reservoir Submergence and Rehabilitation: Six Villages in the Upper Krishna Project*, working paper, 1989.
 9. The policy for Phase II is contained in a Karnataka Government Order of 3 March 1989 as well as in the Revised Rehabilitation and Resettlement Action Plan of the State Government of March 1989. It was unchanged as of December 1989 but was expected to undergo certain changes in subsequent months.
 10. 'If used only as evaluators, sociological knowledge and sociologists arrive late, long after the other experts have made their contributions. They seem wise after the fact, and are defined as persons who only complain about what others have actually done. Their skills are not brought to bear on ongoing social action; since the social process has taken place prior to the evaluation study, it cannot be improved or redirected in retrospect.' (Cernea, 1987).
 11. Scudder, T. and Colson, E., 'From welfare to development: A conceptual framework for the analysis of dislocated people', in *Involuntary Migration and Resettlement* (eds. Hansen, A. and Oliver-Smith, A.), Westview Press, 1982.
 12. These reasons are discussed in Nayak, P. J., *Rehabilitating the Displaced: Policy Options in the Upper Krishna Project*, working paper, 1989.
 13. Scudder, T., 'A sociological framework for the analysis of new land settlements', in *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development* (ed. Cernea, M. M.), Oxford University Press, 1985.
 14. Cernea, M. M., 'Involuntary resettlement and development', *Finance and Development*, September 1988.
 15. The conceptual problems that arise are discussed in greater detail in Shah, A. M., 'Parameters of family policy in India', *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XXIV, no. 10, 1989.
 16. See Nayak, 1989.
 17. See Cernea, 1988.
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