Heritage as life-values: a study of the cultural heritage concept

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For a long time now, the world has been facing a heritage stampede with an array of stakeholders – nations, global heritage organizations, NGOs, terrorists and ordinary people – all claiming their rights to heritage and the past. Hence, there is a great need to understand what heritage does, or what we do with heritage in an everyday context. This article aims to contribute to the discussion through studies of the heritage concept from a theoretical and analytical perspective, starting from a Swedish and European view on heritage; how it came into being, established itself and developed, and finally found itself called into question and at risk of being discarded. Our argument is that the present heritage concept would benefit from the introduction of the concept of life-values, not in order to replace it, but to enrich and take heritage into the 21st century. The article is based on field work in Albania.

Keywords: Albania, concepts of culture, cultural heritage, historiography, life-values.

A semantic analysis of culture and heritage

The everyday notions and use of the Swedish words kultur (culture) and arv (legacy) do not lead to any severe disputes or complications as long as the words are not combined into kulturarv (cultural heritage). But when that is the case, its meaning shifts and kulturarv suddenly becomes complex, diffuse and ambiguous, and seems to lose its semantic meaning. Let us therefore start with an unpacking of its etymological and semantic meanings.

In most of the modern Germanic languages the word kultur exists in more or less similar forms (e.g. Kultur (German), cultuur (Dutch), kultur (Swedish) and culture (English)). In a conservative language such as Icelandic with fewer loan words, the word for culture is menning referring to ‘development, progress and increase’. It is analogous to the same word in Old Norse (Menning) ‘to cultivate, till; inhabit; protect, nurture; honour, worship’. Hence we are dealing with activities that are closely connected to place and place attachment associated with rituals and spirituality. Furthermore, cultivation also means to cultivate one’s mind and intellect and to care for other people’s development – according to Kirsten Hastrup, especially the education of children, which gives direct associations with the Icelandic word menning.

To go further back in history, the word colere/quelere derives from the Proto-Indo European word (PIE) *k₁el- (to move [oneself], to turn [around], rotate). There are a number of cognates (family words) related to *k₁el-; among them the Ancient Greek ἐκλείπω (pelō) meaning ‘I move, walk, I am, I become’. In Sanskrit the word परिल (cārati) has more than 26 different meanings of which the primary ones are ‘to move, walk; spread, be diffused (as fire). In the Old Armenian language, հոյտ (holov) meaning ‘circular movement, circulation’ immediately leads to wheel (English) and hjul (Swedish).

The semantic meaning of words changes all the time, but considering the temporal dimension of the word culture with a history possibly dating back to 7000 BC, it is safe to claim that it has a remarkable semantic continuity revolving around movement, process and progress, and cultivating the land.

Let us now look at the word arv (legacy) from a semantic and etymological perspective. The words arv (Swedish, Danish, Norwegian) and arfr (Icelandic) originate from Old Norse arf (Old Swedish: arf), which is closely related to the German Erbe ‘heritage, heir’. In Old English there is also erf/yrfe meaning ‘heritage, cattle’, and in English and Dutch erf. These words are related to the Latin word orbus and the Ancient Greek ὀρφανός (orphanos) ‘orphan, childless’. In Sanskrit the
word is अर्थ (arba) ‘small’ and in Old Armenian the word is npnp (orb) ‘orphan’. All of these words originate from PIE *h₁orbh- ‘orphan, slave’. Julius Pokorny⁸ suggests PIE *orbh- and adds ‘weak, abandoned’ to the meaning which is in harmony with his suggested related words for ‘work, to work, poor’. Swedish arbete, arbeta and arm respectively, and Czech robot from Proto-Slavonic *orbota ‘hard work, slavery’. In Ancient Greek there is also the meaning of ‘bereft’ and in Latin ‘widowed’. Finally, Wessén argues that the original meaning of arv ‘legacy’ is ‘orphan’.

Additionally, there are the Latin heres ‘heir’ and Ancient Greek γίγος (khēros) ‘widower’, originating from PIE *gher- ‘to be empty, to miss, leave behind’. Latin heres and its later derivation hereditas lead us to the well-known English heir and heritage. Hence, English uses the Latin word hereditas as its official accepted denomination for cultural heritage, or just heritage.

In their original meanings, both heritage and arv reside in emptiness and desolation; something is left behind. This ‘left behind’ may have the qualities, or the potential, to be discovered and filled with meanings that convey values for the next generation. This ‘left behind’ may or may not have a name, but it still seems to convey a value, which from a phenomenological point of view means that cultural heritage precedes itself in a way similar to that in which the object precedes its naming.

Culture and legacy have kept a remarkably steady semantic meaning throughout the centuries revolving around movement, process and progress, and cultivating the land. Combined, however, into kulturav the meaning of the word and its implementation become complex and difficult to grasp.

**Cultural heritage with patriarchal overtones**

In Sweden, Norway and Denmark the word cultural heritage (kulturav) is still in use, although this may be in the process of changing in Sweden since kulturav as a concept is hardly mentioned in the Swedish government law Kulturmiljöns mångfald (2014) (The Diversity of the Cultural Environment)⁷. This fact may be interpreted as meaning that heritage is no longer the central analytical vehicle for an understanding of the past, at least from a political perspective. The consequences of this conceptual shift away from heritage remain to be seen.

In Iceland menningararfur (menning-‘culture’ [-ar-] -arfur ‘legacy’) is used. The official use of the concepts menningararfur and kulturav is well documented, for example, on the Nordic Council of Ministers webpage. If we accept the power position of UNESCO and its World Heritage List, it can be noted that Sweden and Germany use the direct equivalent to the word world heritage (världsarv [Swe.], Welterbe [Germ.]), while Iceland chooses to change to the word heimsmínjar. The original meaning of heimsmínjar was ‘home-monument/home-memory/-memorial/home-remembrance’. The Netherlands uses the word Werelderfgoed for world heritage, which in its semantic parts consists of erf ‘heritage’ and goed ‘property/commodity’, indicating a material dimension of heritage.

The patriarchal overtones in the heritage discourse are obvious by just looking at the World Heritage Convention official emblem, where the Spanish and French denominations of our world heritage are Patrimonio Mundial and Patrimoine Mondial respectively. Patrimonio originates from Latin meaning ‘patrimony, fatherly heritage, fatherly descent’ (pater ‘father’). There is no doubt historically that the concept of heritage has solely been tied to male inheritance of the material and immaterial resources – from father to son. Over the last 60 years, the concept has been widened to include antiquities, ‘roots’, identities and belongings, but it still smacks of male heritage. From this perspective, it is an advantage that the Swedish government law on Cultural Environment (2014) has almost omitted the concept of heritage.

**The qualities of heritages**

Aronsson⁶ argues that the concept of heritage today finds itself in the same position as the concept of culture in the 1990s, when Hannerz (1993) noted that culture is everywhere. Aronsson builds on this and states that heritage in the 21st century is everywhere and therefore nowhere. The concept creates an ambivalence that goes hand in hand with its theorization, globalization and overuse. Klein⁵ gives a historical account of the Swedish heritage concept (kulturav). In Sweden heritage has a documented history going back to the 17th century, when churches, monuments and other antiquities were protected by law. The responsibility for the protection of not only the material heritage but also the immaterial one was taken over by the Antikvitetskollegiet (Board of Antiquities) in 1666. Carl von Linné (1707–78) showed great interest in this work and was a driving force in the collection and ‘discovery’ of economically viable heritage. A hundred years later, Arthur Hazelius, founder of Skansen – the first outdoor museum in the world, made much effort to collect the ‘legacy’ (heritage was not used) of the Swedish people. He focused mainly on the allmoge, the peasants and country people, whose values in this fast-changing society had to be saved for the generations to come. His work laid the foundations of the Nordic Museum collections which contain 400 years of Swedish cultural history. The scientific discipline of Nordic and Comparative Ethnology was founded in 1918 and the rest, as we say, is history leading us up to today’s ‘heritage crusade’ as coined by Lowenthal⁸ in his book The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, and to post-modern statements such as ‘There is no such thing
as heritage’ as expressed by Smith. In other words, heritage falls prey to complexity, diffuseness and ambiguity, and how could it be justifiable to criticize a concept which has lost its semantic meaning? Where and how does the concept of *kulturav* (cultural heritage) regain its identity? Those are burning questions.

The concept of cultural heritage is found within a context of contestation because it is an objective concept which represents phenomena of subjective and intersubjective notions. Cultural heritages (with plural form indicating different ‘things’) in their different shapes – a statue or a landscape, a traditional dance or any museum object – are symbolic constitutions of tangible and intangible elements. The symbolism lies in their qualities of being cultural, social and economic products and political resources, representing people’s different values and thoughts. These different opinions on a particular cultural heritage lead to disagreement over its meaning and create what Ashworth and Tunbridge call ‘dissonant heritage’.

A phenomenological approach to cultural heritage – use and abuse

From a phenomenological perspective, every human being as an individual subject has the power to select those phenomena which transmit values in her own lifeworld, but at the same time she is hampered by the interrelated society. In this she must relate to other human beings and to an everyday reality of social, cultural and historical contexts, including conventions and entrenched patterns of behaviour or so-called typifications. If we apply this idea of cultural heritage we have, on the one hand the subjective aspect and many subjective opinions that create either heritage with intersubjective meanings or dissonant heritage, and on the other, the objective aspect. This objective aspect deals with the heritages that are established and valued through an interpretative prerogative within a power discourse, which Laurajane Smith and Emma Waterton call the authorized heritage discourse (AHD), such as the World Heritage Sites of UNESCO and those defined by ICOMOS. Its Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage decides whether one particular phenomenon is or has the potential of being a world heritage. These ‘heritage experts’, e.g. museum professionals, archaeologists, historians and architects, run the negotiation of the constitution and values of heritage. They are the only ones with the ability, knowledge and understanding to identify these values which they claim are intrinsic to heritage. This objective heritage is an official version that could be seen as belonging to this everyday reality of conventions mentioned above, thus being an obstacle of power to the general public. The objectified phenomena/official heritages have within AHD the ability to manipulate the subject or the multiple subjects thereby creating false intersubjective or collective heritages. Smith further describes AHD as a historic discourse on aesthetic objects, sites and landscapes which today’s people must protect, preserve and honour in their education process on behalf of future generations. It is about forcing a common identity based on the past. According to AHD, heritage includes material structures with distinct boundaries that are manageable in national and international archives and security systems. This idea of the ‘boundedness’ of heritage originates from the national romantic concept of national identity, which results in a marginalization and ignorance of sub-national socio-cultural groups and their values and experiences. It aims to obviate alternative and challenging social, cultural and historical notions and interpretations of heritage. Those people living outside this discourse have their roles as uncritical visitors or passive consumers within a heritage mass tourism. AHD operates with a pure Foucauldian ‘art of government’. Protection of the discourse and its relationship to its properties, territories and citizens constitute the final work of art. This exercise of power is also about identifying risks and manipulating power relations in order to secure the discourse.

The main issue when it comes to cultural heritage is consequently the interpretative prerogative and its ability to be retained as a discursive element through Foucauldian governmentality. As a result, the concept of cultural heritage could be criticized due to the fact that it is often dissonant. What constitutes the heritage or legacy within a particular authorized cultural heritage, if the individual person (the subject) does not recognize it as a heritage or does so but departs from AHD regarding the meanings of this heritage? A semantic paradox emerges in the form of ‘uninherited heritage’, a term used by Grydehøj. Another form of this also exists that can be called ‘inherited non-heritage’. This was observed during a field study of Mount Dajti National Park north of Tirana in Albania, where bunkers and buildings from the communist era were present – phenomena which are in fact culturally inherited but not officially proclaimed as separate cultural heritage sites. We will return to this at the end of the article.

Authorized heritages run the risk of being standardized or typified to the extent that they restrict our own ability to find phenomena that attract us. Authorities could influence our subjective options for cultural heritage, which results in authorized heritages with values that are not necessarily native to them as phenomena. World heritage or other official cultural heritages make up a selection of phenomena with claimed unique and/or universal values. These heritage sites are often also well-attended by tourists, but what lies behind this popularity: is it simply the heritage label or is it the attraction of the site in itself? Since people do not flock to any everyday site or object that is not proclaimed as a heritage – even if it is aesthetic as an official heritage – it is easy to conclude that touristic
and commercial interests are not totally irrelevant when it comes to heritage nominations. When these nominations are made for commercial purposes despite the hostility from local people, one could question the concern about and the preservation of those socio-cultural values that seemed to be implicit in the idea of passing on cultural expressions as inheritance. Interpretative prerogative is against the principle of democratic values. If cultural heritage incorporates the idea of transmitting cultural phenomena as heritage, should not democracy then be regarded as a product evolved through human activity, i.e. through culture?

The universality of cultural heritage – a western invention

Smith and Waterton\(^2\) point out that several scholars claim that the idea of universal values being intrinsic to world heritage is a Western invention, best exemplified by the World Heritage Convention that only universal values could find their true form through European monuments. If we look at the World Heritage List, we can see that most of it comprises of monumental heritage found in European countries. The idea of the universality of heritage and of heritage representing all that is good, secure and undisputed is paradoxical in several ways. First, this idea is related to innateness. But the value of a heritage has the ability to be modified, negotiated, interpreted, reinterpreted and rejected, and therefore this same value could not be innate, authentic and objective. The potential to become a world heritage disproves the existence of universal values: in what form was the value before it became universal? It sounds non-universal with a ‘pre-world heritage’ (like those on UNESCO’s tentative lists) of tentatively universal or pre-universal value. The matter of universal values could also be put into a context of shifting societal and political trends. Heritage cannot be fixed or factual and simultaneously changeable. It is all about interpreted facts, as Schütz\(^16\) puts it. As we have seen, heritage could be dissonant, i.e. disputed and ‘non-universal’. Why would it be necessary to obviate people’s alternative notions of heritage values, if heritage was of universal value? Because there is something of a ‘non-universal’ nature to be obviated.

Secondly, a heritage nomination is possibly also the nomination of a target in wars and conflicts. It is a fact that heritage sites and monuments are destroyed in war-times. Thirdly, the world consists of different cultures and different people with different interests and conceptions of life, or different lifeworlds. Fourthly, the world also comprises of different traditions and life experiences that meet each other. There also exist lifeworlds in crisis in which people’s everyday life consists of surviving the day. Jackson\(^17\) argues that these people do not think much about what is ideologically valuable, real or correct. Cultural and national identities are luxury items that the poor cannot afford; looking for a life is instead the top priority. In this process they may generate mixed heritage or ‘hybrid heritage’ to use Barbro Klein’s\(^18\) term. Bendix\(^19\) further places heritage in a triangle of overlapping terms, together with heredity and hybridity. For example, how could immigrants recognize something yet unknown as their cultural heritage? Heritage is not objectively collective, for the simple reason that everyone does not recognize it as collective. Heritage should, on the other hand, be accessible to anyone who wants to decide for herself its meaning.

The rest of this article will introduce the concept of life-values in relation to heritage and prove its applicability in two case studies: an interview setting in the National History Museum in Tirana, Albania and a field visit to the Dajti Mountain National Park (Parku Komëtar i Malit të Dajtit) just outside of Tirana.

An interview study of the concepts of culture and cultural heritage

As we have seen, the concept of cultural heritage is complex. This can be further clarified by the results from a qualitative interview study of foreign museum visitors’ notions of this concept as well as the closely related concept of culture. The interviews took place at the National History Museum in Tirana during June 2013. The total number of interviewees was 72 (36 male, 36 female). No clear pattern could be drawn from the information based on gender, age, nationality or occupation (education/profession, etc.), which is why such data are left aside in this article. In addition to the questions of the interviewees’ notions about the concept of cultural heritage and culture, there is a third question about their notions of intangible/immaterial heritage. The questions were semi-structured and open-ended in their form, and were simply put: ‘When you hear the word culture/cultural heritage, what is the first thing(s) that comes to your mind?’ ‘Are you familiar with the concept of intangible/immaterial heritage?’ ‘What could that be?‘ ‘What do you think it could be?‘. The interviewees’ responses were then divided into five different categories, based on the answers’ connotative orientation around materiality, immateriality, mix of materiality and immateriality, history and others (the interviewee is unfamiliar with the concept or does not come up with any ideas/the answer does not fit any of the other categories). The variable is based on Lowenthal’s theory on the relationship between history and cultural heritage. His main argument on this matter is that history lies in the past and includes a passive study of our predecessors and a search for ‘truths’. Meanwhile, cultural heritage is found in the immediate present and works for the personal identity based on continuous values. Cultural heritage is valued.
for its capacity to convert history into something which reflects contemporary issues and needs, and not for its historical significance. Heritage is vital and active because it incorporates things that could be actively experienced and sensed, not passively taught.

Despite this distinction between history and cultural heritage, 41 out of 72 interviewees (56.9%) have notions of cultural heritage that include some historical aspect or relate to the past (Figure 1). Another 16 interviewees (22.2%) also make this connection with immaterial heritage, which is a rather high number given that this connection is in most cases already made concerning either cultural heritage or culture (18 out of 72 interviewees, 25%). Figure 2 presents the results of the aspects of materiality and immateriality. Since the analysis is based on (the interviewer’s) subjective interpretations of an interviewee’s answers, in line with a phenomenological approach, this figure is schematic and not fixed. Its aim is to bridge the gap between objectivity and subjectivity, and present general features of the interview responses.

Cultural heritage as life-values – to live before concepts

According to these data, the general notion is that culture is of a more immaterial nature than cultural heritage. As a result, it is also possible to put materiality into a conjoined relationship with history and the past. A parallel with AHD’s idea of the ‘boundedness’ of cultural heritage based on distinct material structures could also be drawn. It is moreover noteworthy that in contrast to Lowenthal’s theory some of the interviewees could not see the role of heritage in the present time at all. There seems to be a gap between the academic and the everyday, i.e. the non-academic understanding of the concept of heritage. Perhaps we are dealing with different discourses. Another example of this issue can be found in a frequent answer in the interviews – identity. It falls under all the three concepts – culture, cultural heritage and immaterial heritage. The concept of identity is widely discussed within the discipline of heritage studies, often associated with the concept of memory. It is generally accepted in heritage studies that cultural heritage evokes memories of past events in a way that can be used in order to build or strengthen our identity. This reasoning is not borne out by the study, where none of the interviewees mentions memory or things that could be connected to commemoration, whether in connection with identity or separately. Is cultural heritage then really capable of recalling memories? Just as heritage is not collective in the sense of producing common values – as concluded before – it is not always a definitive generator of collective identity. Such statements would be too extreme and simplistic.

It is vital to consider that a lack of explicit reference to certain concepts or terms, or even a lack of certain notions and thoughts, does not define the true nature of a particular phenomenon. The way one interviewee responds may depend on rhetorical, verbal and pragmatic aspects, which in turn could be connected to the individual conceptual world related to the interviewee’s native language. The different answers may also be influenced by the particular aims of this interview study of providing notions in a context of spontaneity and immediacy. The arbitrariness of and ambiguities within concepts, as highlighted by the interview study, are the results of an omnipresent individual lifeworld. Aronsson, as mentioned earlier, stresses that cultural heritage is everywhere, and consequently, nowhere, creating an ambivalence where it loses its distinct features and overlaps with the more established concept of culture. We are living the concepts, or even before the very appearance of concepts. In this life sphere, we are not obliged to reflect on what things are and how they relate to each other in a terminological or objective sense. More important is how these things feel as they are.

The arbitrariness mirrors a life situation which is either under the control of authorities or under subjective
control, where the latter enables us to decide our own life-values. On an individual level, these two extremities find their place to a greater or lesser extent. Jackson considers that the general notion of culture today involves an understanding of its pluralistic ambiguities. Culture is at once invented and inherited, contested and recognized, textual and contextual, territorialized and de-territorialized, material and immaterial, high and low and local and global, and all of this is interwoven with historical, ethical, political and practical perspectives. These ambiguities within the concept of culture make it diffuse and hence lead it into de-conceptualization. Jackson further opines that culture becomes the single united concept of distinctive and abstract elements, and that culture is therefore not a proper term. Instead, he finds that the concept of lifeworld is more useful to capture the sense of social fields, including the dynamics of ideas, passions, conflicts, and moral and ethical values as well as dilemmas. These different social expressions and beliefs cannot be measured in terms of antitheses such as true/false, real/unreal, objective/subjective or rational/irrational. In this sense, cultural heritage is, in its ambivalence and overlap with culture, rather just an expression of social behaviour, in whatever form, tangible or intangible, inherited or un-inherited. Thus, it may even be pointless to call it cultural heritage. We might instead talk about different life-values. These include phenomena – material objects or abstract elements – that provide people with life-enhancing meanings. Both constitute the life-values and provide the same. But they are not fixed; they are expressions of subjective fulfilments since every human being decides for herself what is important. Hence, they are also free from interpretative prerogatives. Life-values are omnipresent and transcendent, moving beyond temporal and spatial constraints, since they can be evoked through memories of bygone days and can also exist in the mind as a part of an expectation or a hope of things to come. One life-value may include several narratives, events, processes and associative thoughts, which means that one and the same life-value could exist in different places, both physically and non-physically, and in different times.

**A field study of Mount Dajti National Park, Albania**

The concept of cultural heritage can be further analysed and criticized by putting it into context with other related concepts such as natural heritage, landscape and the frequently used term in Sweden, cultural environment (applied in the Swedish law on cultural heritage). This was done in a field study of Mount Dajti National Park carried out by Johan Josefsson in 2013. The Park lies 26 km to the east of the Albanian capital of Tirana. According to Wikipedia, it is a popular resort for local people and tourists alike. Local people in particular enjoy coming there during winter to experience snow. The park is administered by the Tirana Forest Service Department.

*A walk in the omnipresence of concepts and the presence of life-values*

From the city of Tirana, you can reach the Park by taking a cable car to the foot of the mountain. Two conspicuous mountain peaks meet the visitor’s eyes. On display at their feet is a cultural heritage going back thousands of years with visible traces of past lives embedded in a bilowing natural landscape. On arrival at the cable end station, there is a block of restaurants, a hotel and some shops. One path leads to the panorama outlook of Tirana and another leads towards the mountain, lined with booths selling souvenirs of varying quality. The visitor is immediately targeted and offered advertising handouts. On both sides of the path, horse riding is offered.

Striking, however, is the lack of visitors in a place that has all the prerequisites for mass tourism. Directly at the foot of the mountain lies a dilapidated hotel, whose once-fine fence protects a large garden – rampant, neglected and overgrown. The big open-air café is empty. The word ‘Hotel’ has been added to the building’s run-down ‘Forest Resort’ sign. The garden hides several of the grey cement bunkers that the dictator Enver Hoxha forced the country to build in the 1950s during the communist era. These bunkers are found everywhere and cover the entire country. It is estimated that there are around 700,000 of them – in the words of Howden, an image of ‘paranoia dressed in cement and iron’.

For some people, the bunkers are materialized memories of old oppression, while for others they represent a glorious past (Figure 3). But the bunkers in the wild and overgrown garden are isolated,
both physically and mentally because of the lack of people. Further down the road another couple of bunkers are found, seemingly hidden in the woods. The situation becomes rather bizarre, these mirroring the isolation endured during the communist era. The bunkers are de facto cultural legacies, that is, heritage. But as they are unclaimed and unnoticed, they remain just potential heritage in the sense of official heritage.

According to tourist information there should be a trail up to the mountain top, but no information about the path, or the national park in general can be found in a language accessible to most tourists. The information signs with maps are so heavily damaged by moisture that it is doubtful whether even the Albanian-speaking people can make use of them. A map purchased earlier at a store close to the cable car, shows a sketch of the mountain where the trail to the top is marked with a red line following the shape of the mountain. This ‘map’ serves more as the reflection of an absurdity than as a guide to a territory. Lost without a real map, we decide to follow a path behind a huge yellow housing complex with a communist architectural history (Figure 4). The building has no windows, only empty holes like gaping wounds in the massive cement walls. The building expresses forlornness, until it is discovered that some people are carrying items into the house, as if they are moving in. And some have already moved in, as there are clothes hanging on a washing line.

The house with its squatters and the hotel with its overgrown garden and bunker relics suggest a dream of tourism that never came true. What is left is an unspoken and tacit heritage within an outspoken, but not considered, heritage milieu. It is a deserted national park. What is this all about? Is this about natural heritage, or only nature, or both nature and culture, and then... natural/cultural landscape or natural/cultural milieu? Is it possibly only a badly managed national park located in an unnoticed place consisting of contemporaneous heritage markers in decay? Or is it, about cultural expressions in the form of material entities that are part of entropic processes – things in decay as mutable things – as suggested by DeSilvey. This would add new dimensions to our perception of this landscape. These buildings, as non-official heritage markers, might tell us more about Albania than an official natural/cultural heritage site – the national park – does. A paradox is created, where these phenomena become inherited as ‘non-heritage’. They have the properties of heritage in the sense that they are products of human activities, left and transferred to the next generation of people but are not officially called heritage. Here the concept of heritage amongst others, becomes semantically vague and arbitrary. Problems then arise over whether to classify phenomena as ‘cultural heritage’ when they may ‘be’ something else, or whether not to give them the heritage label when may be suitable, but not necessary.

As in the case of the interviews, this is about a concept complexity in the form of a concept’s overlapping character. Also evident here is the ambivalence of cultural heritage, which Aronsson highlights, that causes it to encroach upon the more established concept of culture. Cultural heritage is omnipresent, and still, nowhere. It is difficult to say what is at this place, but easy to say what it feels like as a subjective experience. It can also be observed that the place and its content have been filled with dissonance, even if this may only exist between the visitor and the place.

Following the path behind the yellow house, the forest comes closer. Roads wind between tall, closely packed trees and in the distance there is the sound of traditional Albanian music. The roads are wide and muddy with tracks from motor vehicles. Having got lost, I head roughly towards the right..., which is apparently the...
wrong direction. Being in a national park, my surprise is considerable when an armed soldier appears and informs me I am close to entering a military zone. Back-tracking and heading in the opposite direction is now the most suitable choice.

Two hours later, I find myself between the two largest summits. I choose to walk towards the left one, which is also the highest peak (1613 m). But before that, I pause to take in my immediate surroundings – there is something familiar with the vegetation, something from home, not foreign. The forest gives way to meadows which in turn yield to the forest again. Rain hangs heavily in the air, and so does history. A wide, deep hole with white stones reveals a past human and natural activity. I explore this and then continue wandering through the forest. After a while the trees disappear, and as in a lavish film, the most beautiful, deep and perfectly dimensioned view unexpectedly opens up, painted in surrealistic colours. At that moment scientific concepts and definitions become irrelevant and uninteresting: the nature of cultural heritage and culture of natural heritage are in sublime harmony (Figure 5). I could regard this view as a typified construction and categorize it as landscape in accordance with previous experiences, but instead choose to ascribe individual characteristics to it. By absorbing its aesthetics the visitor permanently ‘intentionalizes’ the view, in the sense of Husserl, in mind and body.

The Mount Dajti National Park rests within the original meaning of heritage and legacy – something that is left behind, to be discovered and re-discovered over and over again, that is filled with meanings conveying values in the present as well as for future generations and visitors.

3. Linguistics Research Center, College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin; [http://www.utexas.edu/cela/centers/lrc/ielex/PokornyMaster-X.html](http://www.utexas.edu/cela/centers/lrc/ielex/PokornyMaster-X.html) (accessed on 4 June 2015).

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